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The federal government was the original
owner of virtually the entire American
West. As states were admitted to the Union,
the United States retained title to the vast
public lands, subject to disposal under the
federal lands laws.
Although the federal government continues to
retain and manage vast acreage, it rejected
adoption of a general federal water law and
instead acquiesced in the appropriation of
waters on the federal lands by private
persons pursuant to state law.
In the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 18771/
Congress acknowledged the established
practice of the early settlers that water on
public lands may be diverted by private
citizens on the basis of first in time and
without regard to the eastern rules of
riparian rights.2/
1/	 For ease of reading, all cases and statutes are referred
to throughout by short name. Full citations are provided in
the Appendix.
2/	 The Act of July 26, 1866 provided: "That whenever, by_
priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and
accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the
local customs, laws, and the decisions of the courts, the
possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained
and protected in the same; and the right of way for the
construction of ditches and canals for the purposes aforesaid
is hereby acknowledged and confirmed . . . ." The Act of July
9, 1870 stated: "[AM patents granted, or preemption or
homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued
water rights, or right to ditches and reservoirs used in
(Footnote continued on next page)
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In California Oregon Power v. Beaver 
Portland Cement (U.S. 1935) the Court, in
rejecting a claim that riparian rights
attached to land acquired under the
Homestead Act, found that acts of 1866,
1870, and 1977 "effected a severance of all
waters upon the public domain, not
theretofore appropriated, from the land
itself". Moreover, the Court ruled, the
effect of the Act was not limited to desert
land entries, but to all lands acquired from
the public domain under any land statute
before or after 1866.
While it is clear that Congress in enacting
these three statutes "severing" water from
the public lands rejected the development of
a comprehensive federal water law, it cannot
be said that Congress intended to relinquish
all federal interest in waters on its land.
Such a conclusion is fundamentally at odds
with the well established recognition of
federal regulatory power under the reserved
rights doctrine, the navigation servitude,
the reclamation laws, the federal power act,
and other authority. The better
construction is that articulated in the
Olson Opinion (1982): "[Wle believe that
the sounder view is that the Mining Acts and
Desert Land Act authorize state control only
over appropriations by private individuals
of unappropriated water on federal lands,
and do not, by their terms, cede to the
states control over the federal government's
use of water for federal purposes and
programs." Opinion at 58.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
connection with such water rights, as may have been acquired
under or recognized by the [1866 Act]." The Desert Land Act of
1877 provided: "Provided, however, That the right to the use
of water [by the claimant] shall depend upon bona fide prior
appropriation: . . . and all surplus water over and above such
actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all
lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public
lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the
appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining, and




II. RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
The reserved rights doctrine was
foreshadowed by Rio Grande Dam (U.S. 1899),
a case in which the Court found that
Congress had not waived its superior
authority under the Commerce Clause to
protect navigation despite the fact that it
had acquiesced in the recognition of the
prior appropriation doctrine in the western
states.
Winters (U.S. 1906), dealing with an Indian
reservation in Montana, was the first case
to articulate the reserved rights doctrine
which holds that where Congress (or the
President) reserves land for a particular
purpose it also reserves, by implication,
sufficient unappropriated water to
accomplish the purposes of the reservation.
In FPC v. Oregon (U.S. 1955) the Court first
hinted that the doctrine might extend to
other federal reservations. There the Court
held that the Desert Land Act (which
subjected public lands to the rule of prior
appropriation) was inapplicable to
reservations. While the case was not
decided under the rubric of the reserved
rights doctrine, and did not involve the
direct use of water on a federal reservation
by the United States, the Court implied that
the private licensee was exercising a right
of the United States which had been withheld
from state control as a function of the
reservation of land for a power site.
In Arizona v. California (U.S. 1963) the
Court confirmed that the doctrine was
equally applicable to all federal
reservations.
In Cappaert (U.S. 1976) the Court reaffirmed
the doctrine and clarified that the amount
of water impliedly reserved was the amount







In U.S. v. New Mexico (U.S. 1978) the Court
limited reserved rights that water needed to
achieve the "primary purposes" of the
reservation.
These cases make clear that the federal
power to reserve water is constitutionally
grounded in the property clause and the
commerce clause, and that inconsistent state
law may be preempted under the supremacy
clause. But this only shows that Congress
has the power to reserve water, not that it
has chosen to do so. The reserved rights
theory comes in to play to fill the gap when
Congress has not said one way or the other.
While the doctrine is technically no more
than a principle of statutory construction
aimed at divining congressional intent, the
cases' often mechanical application of the
doctrine has caused some to ponder whether
the doctrine is really one of federal common
law. See Grow & Stewart (1977). Take, for
instance, the courts' preoccupation in
Block/Lyng and Watt with the fine question
of whether a particular statute did or did
not effect a withdrawal. It hardly seems
that this technicality could be controlling
on the issue of congressional intent, yet
the courts treat it like it is.
A fundamental element of the reserved rights
doctrine is that the water right is awarded
a priority date tied to the date of
reservation. This is so even when the
actual use begins some time later, and
private appropriators subsequent to the
reservation are thereby made junior to the
federal right.
In Bell (Colo. 1986), however, the Colorado
court ruled that the federal government's
failure to assert a reserved rights claim in
an ongoing general adjudication in which it
had been joined results in loss of priority
under Colorado's system of ongoing
adjudications. The court implies, however,
that the federal government is immune from
loss of priority until it is joined, and may
then be awarded a back-dated priority date
if it asserts its reserved rights prior to










In U.S. v. Denver the court awarded reserved
rights for the Rocky Mountain National Park
which had first been reserved as a national
forest, and later as a national park. The
court awarded separate priority dates: the
earlier date where the purposes related to
the original forest reservation, and the
later date where the purpose arose only upon
designation as a park.
Likewise in Block/Lyng the court found where
the purposes of the wilderness designation
overlapped with the purposes of the previous
designation, the right would retain the
earlier priority date.
Winters (U.S. 1906) involved an Indian
reservation, and for many years the doctrine
was thought to apply only to such lands.
reservations	 Arizona v. California (U.S. 1963) and
subsequent cases have made clear that the
doctrine applies to all federal
reservations. As the court said in County 
of Eagle (Colo. 1971), "The federally
reserved lands include any federal
enclave." County of Eagle at 523.
Public lands	 In Sierra Club v. Watt (D.C. Cir. 1981) the
D.C. Circuit rejected Sierra Club's argument
that FLPMA effectively reserved all the
public lands thereby creating reserved water
rights on those lands. The court ruled that
FLPMA did not reserve any land and that its
savings clause precluded the creation of any
reserved rights.
Acquired
lands	 The Olson Opinion (1982) concluded that the
reserved rights doctrine was applicable to
acquired lands as well as to lands
originally withdrawn from the public
domain. Opinion at 77-78.
MUSYA	 In U.S. v. New Mexico (U.S. 1978) the Court
held (arguably in dictum) that the Multiple
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Wilderness
Use Sustained Yield Act did not constitute a
separate reservation of land with attendant
water rights, but merely outlined additional
supplemental purposes for forest management.
The Colorado court followed suit in U.S. v. 
Denver (Colo. 1982) holding that the MUSYA
EFEWEId no new water rights.
So did the Special Master in Molycorp (1986).
In Sierra Club v. Block/Lyng (D. Colo. 1985)
(now on appeal) the district court
recognized the existence of reserved water
rights for wilderness areas, but stopped
short of ordering the federal government to
assert the rights. Instead, Judge Kane
ordered the United States to prepare a
report identifying methods of protecting
wilderness values in the twenty-four
wilderness areas in Colorado. On November
26, 1986, the United States submitted a two
and one half page report concluding that
there was no practical need to assert these
rights.
Meanwhile in New Mexico the United States
has been defending the principle of reserved
rights for wilderness (as well as under the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and MUSYA). The
special master in Molycorp., however,
recently rejected the reasoning of
Block/Lyng and ruled that no reserved rights
exist for wilderness or for wild and scenic
rivers. The sparely reasoned opinion
concluded that these statutes were mere land
management programs whose savings clauses
denied the implication of new reserved
rights.
Wild and
scenic rivers The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is the only
federal statute which contains explicit
recognition of reserved water rights (albeit
phrased in the negative): "Designation of
any stream or portion thereof as a national
wild, scenic or recreational river area
shall not be construed as a reservation of
the waters of such streams for purposes
other than those specified in this chapter,
- 7 -
or in quantities greater than necessary to
accomplish these purposes." Rivers Act, S
1284(c).
The legislative history, as well, contains
clear recognition of the intent to reserve
water. "Enactment of this bill would
reserve to the United States sufficient
unappropriated water flowing through Federal
lands involved to accomplish the purpose of
the legislation." 114 Cong. Rec. 28,313
(Nov. 26, 1968) (Sen. Gaylord Nelson).
Curiously, the immediately preceding
subsection (b) seems to contradict
subsection (c). "Nothing in this chapter
shall constitute an express or implied claim
or denial on the part of the Federal
Government as to exemption from State water
laws." Rivers Act, 5 1284(b). This savings
clause was found to be "a non sequitur" by
the Krulitz Opinion at 608 n.99.
The special master in Molycorp, however,
seized upon the language of subsection (b)
and ignored the language in subsection (c)
in reaching its conclusion that the Rivers
Act does not create reserved water rights.
Stockwatering
reservations	 Public Water Reserve No. 107 (1926) reserved
"every smallest legal subdivision of the
public land surveys which is vacant,
unappropriated unreserved land and contains
a spring or water hole, and all land within
one quarter of a mile of every spring or
water hole located on unsurveyed public
land".
In Hyrup v. Kleppe (D.Colo. 1976) the
district court ruled that the reservation of
watering holes pursuant to Reserve No. 107
was limited to non-tributory sources.
This reasoning was rejected by the Colorado
court in U.S. v. Denver (Colo. 1982) which
held that the reservation included both
tributary and nontributary sources. The
Colorado court, however, ruled that the
reservation was not for the entire yield of
the springs, but only for animal and human
consumption in the amount needed to prevent
monopolization.
- 8 -
The State Engineer of Nevada followed the
Denver reasoning as well in his award of
stockwatering rights under the 1926
reservation to the BLM in 1985.
The Krulitz Opinion concluded that the 1926
order reserved water not only for
stockwatering but for crops, fish, and
wildlife, and for flood, soil and erosion
control. The Opinion went on to hold that
the quantity reserved was the total yield of
each source. Finally, the Opinion concluded
that the reservation encompassed both
tributary and nontributary sources.
In 1983 Solicitor Coldiron rejected the
Krulitz Opinion and adopted the reasoning




Typically the only waters claimed to fall
within the scope of the reserved rights
doctrine are waters flowing within or
adjacent to a federal enclave.
Cappaert (U.S. 1976), however, applied to
groundwater.
In Bell (Colo. 1986) the United States
claimed reserved water from the Colorado
River which ran within one half mile of a
federal Naval Oil Shale Reserve. Because of
the government's failure to timely assert
the claim, however, the Colorado court found
it unnecessary to reach the question of
whether waters outside a reservation can be
reserved. Bell at 645 n.l.
What purposes
are included? 
U.S. v. New Mexico (U.S. 1977) was the first
case in which the Court denied a federal
reserved water right. In this 5-4 decision,
the Court drew a distinction between the
primary and secondary purposes of a
- 9 -
reservation, holding that the Forest Service
Organic Act (1897) contained only two
primary purposes: timber production and
watershed management. Reserved rights for
recreation, wildlife, aesthetics, and
stockwatering on national forests were
rejected.
In U.S. v. Denver (Colo. 1982) the United
States tailored its reserved rights claims
around the New Mexico holding, but the
Colorado court rejected the claims because
the government's factual case was based on
"sparse evidence" of the need for instream
flows for watershed and timber protection.
In the same case the court also rejected the
federal government's claim for a reserved
right for rafting flows on the Yampa River
flowing within the Dinosaur National
Monument on the basis that as a matter of
law the primary purpose of the withdrawal
was to protect dinosaur bones and historic
fish habitat, not boating.
Likewise in U.S. v. Alpine Land (9th Cir.
1983) the Ninth Circuit found that the
evidence presented by the United States of
the need for instream flows for timber and
watershed was "insignificant".
III. PREEMPTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY TO APPROPRIATE
Basic theory
Misnomer
A great deal has been written about the yet
untested theory of federal "nonreserved
water rights".
At the outset it should be said that the
term "nonreserved water right" is a
misnomer--a handy but misleading shorthand.
Unlike reservations of land which carry with
them property rights in water by virtue of
the reservation, the theory first announced
in the Krulitz Opinion does not involve
direct congressional creation of water
rights. Rather, the idea is that the
Congress may implicitly confer upon a
federal agency a power or authority to
appropriate water at a later date. For a
good discussion of this semantical point see





On the one hand, this theory of preemptive
administrative authority is narrower than
the reserved rights theory in that rights do
not arise automatically when land is
reserved, but only upon use of the water.
Thus the United States cannot claim a
back-dated priority which overrides all
private uses subsequent to the congressional
action.
On the other hand, it is broader than the
reserved rights doctrine in that it is not
dependent upon a reservation of land nor
limited to the primary purposes of the
reservation.
In short, the federal agency must wait in
line like any other user, but once it gets
to the counter the state may not reject the
agency's application so long as it relates
to any federal land management objective.
The first and the broadest articulation of
the administrative authority to appropriate
is found in the Krulitz Opinion (1979).
Solicitor Krulitz determined that the
federal government is empowered to preempt
state law as necessary when four conditions
are met: Cl) the Congress assigns a land
management function to a federal agency, (2)
the Congress did not expressly prohibit the
preemption, (3) unappropriated water is
available, and (4) the water is in fact put
to use.
Solicitor Martz's Opinion (1979) embraced
the general reasoning of the Krulitz
Opinion, but concluded that as applied to
the Taylor Grazing Act and FLPMA no
authority to preempt state law was
intended. This left the theory in tact but
of vastly diminished applicability.
Solicitor Coldiron did an about face with
his 1981 Opinion which flatly announced,
"[T]here is no federal 'non-reserved' water
right". Opinion at 1064. Even Solicitor
Coldiron, however, did not doubt the
Congress' power to preempt. Instead, he
concluded that Congress has not exercised it





Olson	 Finally, the Olson Opinion (1982) was
released with great fanfare by the
Department of Justice. Their press releases
announced, "The nightmare is over."
Environmentalists quickly responded, "The
nightmare is just beginning for fish and
wildlife." The opinion itself, however, was
a far cry from what the public posturing on
both sides would have suggested. In fact
the Opinion is a thoughtfully reasoned
rejection of the Coldiron Opinion, and it
articulates a theoretical basis for
asserting preemptive federal appropriative
water rights. After 80 pages of analysis,
however, the Opinion stopped short of
applying its reasoning to particular
statutes, settling instead for the
observation that "such rights probably
cannot be asserted under the current
statutory schemes".
Why it matters The only reason that this theory of
preemptive administrative authority is
necessary is that traditional western state
water law often frustrates federal land
management objectives. In other words,
where state law permits the sort of
appropriations the federal government seeks,
there is no need for and nothing to be
gained by preemption.
Instream flows The typical sore spot is instream flows.
Historically western states required
diversion to a beneficial use before a water
right may be recognized. In recent years
virtually all of the western states have
made some progress toward accommodation of
instream uses into the prior appropriation
system.
But even in those states which have
recognized instream flow rights, barriers
remain to federal acquisition of water for
instream flow purposes under state law.
Colorado
	
For instance, the National Park Service
acquired an inholding in the Rocky Mountain
National Park with appurtenant agricultural
water rights. When the United States sought
to apply the water to instream use in the
Park, the State Engineer placed it on the
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Nevada
abandonment list on the theory that only the
Colorado Water Conservation Board may hold
an instream flow right. (That's an
interesting response coming from a state
which has argued repeatedly that if the
federal government wants water for instream
flows it should pay for it 	 Here the
federal government has paid for it, and the
state still refuses to accommodate it.) The
United States has now filed for a change in
use, the Water Board is opposing it, and the
matter is before the water court. If it
turns out that the Park Service cannot hold
the right under state law, the argument for
federal preemption would seem to follow.
A similar case is now before the Nevada
Supreme Court. In 1979 the Bureau of Land
Management filed an application for an
instream flow water right to protect a
spectacular mountain fishery known a Blue
Lakes. The Attorney General objected
arguing that a diversion is still a
prerequisite to a water right in Nevada
(despite the fact that the legislature had
declared recreation to be a beneficial use
in 1969). NWF and the Sierra Club
intervened in support of the BLM. When the
State Engineer granted the water right to
the BLM, the Attorney General sued the State
Engineer. The trial court upheld the
issuance of the instream flow water right
(and reversed on an unrelated stockwatering
issue), and the matter is now on appeal.
Again, should the state refuse to
accommodate the BLM's instream flow needs,




water rights" Some have suggested that various federal
regulatory powers which interfere with water
rights create new "regulatory water
rights". (For a good discussion, see
Tarlock (1985).) For instance, if the
federal government prohibits a person from
exercising her water right held under state
law by denying her a . section 404 permit, the
government, it is said, has thereby created
a property right in itself. This analysis,
- 13 -
Purchase
however, is a precarious one in two
respects. First, most property rights (as
opposed to contractual rights) vest
interests which may be asserted against all
other parties. But if the federal
government stops person X from using her
water, it does not thereby obtain an
exclusive "property" interest in X's water.
This is so because nothing stops person Y
who does not need a section 404 permit from
appropriating the water.
Moreover, what is to distinguish this sort
of "regulatory property right" from "rights"
which might be said to arise any time the
government regulates anything? If the
government zones land to prohibit tall
buildings, does it obtain "regulatory air
rights"? If it requires people to mow their
lawns, has it obtained "regulatory scenic
easements"? If it insists that people stop
their cars at red lights, doesn't the same
analysis require that we label this some
sort of a property right too?
While the "regulatory rights" approach has
some appeal, in the long run it may do more
to confuse the analysis than to enlighten it.
Others have suggested that if the government
wants to control water, it should pay for
the right. While this argument makes at
least academic sense when applied to
reallocation of existing rights, it has no
applicability to the issue of reserved
rights or preemptive administrative
authority--because these theories relate
only to unappropriated water.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
McCarran Amendment The McCarran Amendment (1952) waived federal
sovereign immunity and granted consent to
joint the United States in state court
general adjudications of water rights.
In Dugan v. Rank (U.S. 1963) the Court held
that the McCarran Amendment only applies to
general adjudications wherein priorities are




In County of Eagle (U.S. 1971) the Court
rejected an argument by the United States
that the McCarran Amendment applies only to
federal water rights acquired under state
law and not to reserved rights. The Court
also found that the act applies to
Colorado's system of permanent, ongoing
general adjudications.
In CRWCD v. U.S. (U.S. 1976) the Court ruled
that while the McCarran Amendment does not
establish the exclusive jurisdictional basis
for adjudication of federal water rights, a
duplicative federal suit may be dismissed
where a McCarran Amendment proceeding is
underway.
In South Delta Water Agency (9th Cir. 1985)
the court reiterated that the McCarran
Amendment is not "a condition that must be
met to bring a water rights dispute case
against the United States" if jurisdiction
could be grounded in other general
jurisdiction statutes such as section
1331.)
The Idaho court ruled in Avondale Irrigation 
Dist. (Idaho 1978) that the United States
may claim the entire flow of streams on
reserved land, without quantifying the
claim, even though a state statute requires
numerical quantification. But if entire
flow is not needed to meet the primary
purposes of the reservation, then the United
States must quantify its needs.
In U.S. v. Denver (Colo. 1982) the court
ordered the federal government to quantify
its water rights on the Yampa River within
six months.
In Nevada v. U.S. (U.S. 1983) the Court
ruled that the federal government's claims






directives Regardless of whether one views the reserved
rights doctrine as a technique of statutory
construction or a rule of federal common
law, there is no doubt that either way
Congress has the power to change the
doctrine as it pleases.
To date the Congress has shied away from the
issue, speaking when it does in meaningless
gobbledygook. (Take, for example, "Nothing
in this chapter shall constitute an express
or implied claim or denial on the part of
the Federal Government as to exemption from
State water laws." Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, 16 U.S.C.	 1284(b) (1982).)
But there are signs that those days may be
over. Two recent reservations contained
explicit rejections of new reserved
rights.3/
3/ (1) "Nothing in [this act] shall be construed to reserve
any water for purposes of the [Mono Basin National
Forest] Scenic Area or to affirm, deny, or otherwise
affect the present (or prospective) water rights of any
person or of the State of California or of any
political subdivision thereof (including the city of
Los Angeles), nor shall any provision of [this act] be
construed to cause, authorize, or allow any
interference with or infringement of such water rights
so long as, and to the extent that, those rights remain
valid and enforceable under the laws of the State of
California." California Wilderness Act (1984).
(2) "Nothing in [this act] shall be construed to establish
a new express or implied reservation to the United
States of any water or water-related right with respect
to the land described in [this act]; Provided, That the
United States shall be entitled to only that express or
implied reserved water right which may have been
associated with the initial establishment and
withdrawal of Humboldt National Forest and the Lehman
Caves National Monument from the public domain with
respect to the land described in [this act]. No
provision of [this act] shall be construed as
authorizing the appropriation of water, except in
accordance with the substantive and procedural law of





This appears to be timely, as at least one
court has shown some impatience with
Congress' unwillingness to grapple with the
water issue: "When Congress passed MUSYA,
it was aware of the reserved rights
doctrine. Congress, however, chose not to
reserve additional water explicitly. In the
face of its silence, we must assume that
Congress intended the federal government to
proceed like any other appropriator and to
apply for or purchase water rights when
there was a need for water." U.S. v. Denver 
at 26 (Colo. 1982) (citations omitted). One
might argue that just the opposite
implication should be drawn from
congressional silence, but however that may
be, the point is that continued silence
constitutes a form of congressional Russian
roulette.
Clearly there is a need to resolve
uncertainties attending federal water rights
by quantifying them and putting them in the
State Engineer's computer for consistent
administration. When particular conflicts
arise over particular new additions to
federal reservations, we may expect
precisely that result.
Quantifying water rights on existing federal
lands or on large new reservations, however,
presents a far more difficult problem.
Unless the entire flow is to be claimed
(which often may be the simplest solution)
the government is required to conduct
complex on-site measuring throughout each of
the seasons before it can determine what
flows are necessary to maintain natural
systems.
Ways are now being explored by the Sierra 
Club v. Block/Lyng litigants to allow for
quantification, but postpone the task until
an actual conflict arises. Recognizing the
prohibitive cost of quantifying all
wilderness water rights (unless the entire
flow is claimed), this may be the best
alternative.
While Congress has rejected a general
federal water law, its deference to state
water law has been equivocal. In
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fundamental ways it has refused to let the
states go their own way, and has in many
respects brought about reform and conformity
within western state allocation
systems--particularly in the area of
instream flow management and environmental
protection.
At the same time the reserved rights
doctrine has had an undeniably disruptive
effect on western water administration.
This may best be remedied by gradual--not
hasty--quantification.
At the same time, much of the steam may be
taken out of the "administrative authority
to appropriate" (a/k/a non-reserved rights)
argument if western states continue to make
progress toward accommodating federal
interests, particularly in the area of
instream flows. This would appear to be a
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aff'g Sierra Club V. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C.
1080) (Escalante decision).
	
1982:	 United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1
(1982); United States v. City and County of Denver, 656
P.2d 36 (1982) (companion case) .
	
1983:	 United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co.,
modified, 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983), modifying 503
F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. 
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee-Carson 
Irrigation Dist., 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. 
Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 431 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied sub nom. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 909 (1971) (related case).
	
1983:	 Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), rev'q 
United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649
F.2d 1286 (9th Cit. 1981), and amendment 666 F.2d 351
(9th Cit. 1982), on remand 720 F.2d 622 (9th Cit.
1983), and 107 F.R.D. 377 (D. Nev. 1985), (federal
government's claims to reserved rights are subject to
rules of res judicata).
	
1985:	 South Delta Water Agency v. United States Dep't of 
Interior, 767 F.2d 531 (9th Cit. 1985).
1985: In the Matter of Applications 37061, et al. (Ruling of
the Nevada State Engineer, July 26, 1985) (some aspects
of this ruling are on appeal sub. nom. State v. Nevada
Division of Water Resources, No. 18105 (Nev. filed Mar.
4, 1987)).
	
1985:	 Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985),
appeal filed sub nom. Sierra Club v. Lyng).
	
1986:	 United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
pending: New Mexico v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, No.
CV-9780 C (D. N.M. Special Master's report March 27,
1986) (Red River Adjudication); New Mexico v. Arellano,
No. CV-76-036-C (D. N.M. Special Master's report March
27, 1987) (San Cristobal Adjudication) (consolidated
cases referred to jointly as "Molycorp.").
pending: State v. Nevada Division of Water Resources, No. 18105
(Nev. filed Mar. 4, 1987)
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Federal Land Statutes and Executive Orders (by year) 
	
1862:	 Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392
(previously codified in part as amended at 43 U.S.C. SS
161-163 (1982)) (repealed by FLPmA).
	
1866:	 Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified at
50 U.S.C. SS 51, 52, 43 U.S.C. S 661 (1982)).
	
1877:	 Desert Land Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377
(codified generally at 43 U.S.C. SS 321-339 (1982)).
	
1897:	 Forest Service Organic Administration Act of June 4,
1897, ch. 1, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. SS 473-482, 551 (1982)).
	
1906:	 American Antiquities Preservation Act of June 8, 1906,
ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 255 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
SS 431-433 (1982)).
	
1916:	 National Park Service Act of August 25, 1916, ch. 408,
39 Stat. 535 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. SS 1,
2-3 (1982)).
	
1926:	 Public Water Reserve No. 107, Executive Order of April
17, 1926 (issued pursuant to section 10 of the Stock
Raising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 865
(formerly codified to 43 U.S.C. § 300 (repealed by
FLPMA)).
	
1934:	 Taylor Grazing Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat.
1269 (codified at 43 U.S.C. SS 315-315m (1982)).
	
1952:	 McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. S 666 (1982) (enacted in
1952 as an rider to the Department of Justice
Appropriations Act, SS 208(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560 (1952)).
	
1960:	 Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of June 12, 1960, Pub.
L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
SS 528-531 (1982) ("MUSYA").
	
1964:	 Wilderness Act of Sept. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78
Stat. 890 (codified at 16 U.S.C. SS 1131-1136 (1982)).
	
1966:	 National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of Oct. 15,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 927 (codified at 16
U.S.C. 5 668dd (1982)).
	1968:	 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
SS 1271-1287 (1982 & Supp. 1985)).
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1976:	 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of Oct. 21,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified
primarily at 43 U.S.C. SS 1701-1784 (1982)) ("FLPMA").
1978:	 Public Rangelands Improvement Act of Oct. 25, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified at 43
U.S.C. SS 1901-1908 (1982).
1984:	 California Wilderness Act of Sept. 28, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1632 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
S 543c(h) (1985 Supp.)).
1986:	 Great Basin National Park Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-565, 100 Stat. 3182 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A.
410mm-(h) (1987 pocket part)).
DOJ and DOI Opinions on Federal Water Rights (by year) 
1979:	 Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish
and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the
Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (June
25, 1979) (by Solicitor Leo Krulitz) (Opinion M-36914).
1981:	 Supplement to Solicitor Opinion No. M-36914, on Federal
Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish &
Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau
of Land Management, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (Jan. 16,
1981) (by Solicitor Clyde 0. Martz) (Opinion M-36914,
Supp.).
1981:	 Nonreserved Water Rights--United States Compliance with
State Law, 88 Interior Dec. 1055 (Sept. 11, 1981) (by
Solicitor William H. Coldiron) (Opinion M-36914, Supp.
I).
1982:	 Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal
Memorandum: Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights (June
16, 1982) (by Assistant Attorney General Theodore B.
Olson) (this unpublished opinion is available from the
author).
1983:	 Purposes of Executive Order of April 17, 1926,
Establishing Public Water Reserve No. 107, 90 Interior
Dec. 81 (Feb. 16, 1983) (by Solicitor William H.
Coldiron) (Opinion M-36914, Supp. II).
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- 22 -
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493-572 (1986) (casebook by West Publishing Co.).
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Shurts, FLPMA, Fish and Wildlife, and Federal Water Rights, 15
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15 Cap. U.L. Rev. 479 (1986).
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Water L. Rev. 29 (1987).
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Trelease, Uneasy Federalism--State Water Laws and National Water 
Uses, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 751 (1980).
Waring and Samelson, Non-Indian Federal Reserved Water Rights,
58 Denver L.J. 783 (1981).
Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National
Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
Witte, The Instream Effect of Reserved Rights (1986)
(unpublished article produced by the Colorado Office of the
Attorney General).
Comment, Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights, 15 Land & Water L.
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